Scientific schools

Interview with ALEXANDER G. DUGIN, Dr. of Sc. (Political Sciences, Social Sciences), Professor, Leader of the International Eurasian Movement

Vestnik RUDN. International Relations. ISSN 2313‐0660 (print), ISSN 2313‐0679 (online) 2022 Vol. 22 No. 1 142—152


DOI: 10.22363/2313-0660-2022-22-1-142-152

Eurasianism as a Non‐Western Episteme for Russian Humanities
Interview with ALEXANDER G. DUGIN,
Dr. of Sc. (Political Sciences, Social Sciences), Professor,
Leader of the International Eurasian Movement 1
Abstract. Alexander Gelyevich Dugin is a Soviet and Russian
philosopher, political scientist, sociologist, theorist, PhD in philosophy,
Dr. of Sc. (Political Sciences, Social Sciences), professor, leader of the
International Eurasian Movement. He is Professor Emeritus at Eurasian
National University named after L.N. Gumilev and Tehran University,
visiting Professor at Southern Federal University, Senior Research
Fellow at Fudan University (Shanghai). Alexander G. Dugin is the author
of a number of journalistic publications, as well as scientific articles and
textbooks on geopolitics and international relations, theory of a
multipolar world. He has served as editor-in-chief of the “EON”
publishing center, “Dear Angel” publishing house, and the journal
“Elements.” Since 1991, he has been the Chairman of the historicalreligious
Association “Arktogeya.” From 1997 to 1999, he was the author
and host of the program “Geopolitical Review” (Radio Free Russia). In
1998—2003, an advisor to the Chairman of the Russian State Duma.
Since 2001, Chairman of the Political Council (leader) of the All-Russian
Socio-Political Movement “Eurasia.” In 2008 to 2014, Professor, Head of
the Department of Sociology of International Relations, Director of the
Center for Conservative Research at the Faculty of Sociology at Moscow
State University named after M.V. Lomonosov. In 2016—2017,
editor-in-chief of “Tsargrad” TV channel. In his interview, Alexander G. Dugin discusses the concept of
Eurasianism, its main schools, directions and representatives. Particular attention is paid to the influence of
Eurasianism on Russia’s foreign policy and the strategic partnership between Russia and China. The interview deals
with the specifics of Eurasian studies in Kazakhstan and Turkey. The leader of the International Eurasian Movement
emphasizes that multipolarity is accompanied by the presence of both external and internal poles.
Key words: Eurasianism, geopolitics, Greater Eurasia, non-Western IR theory, episteme, multipolarity,
Russia, China, West, Global South
© Dugin A.G., 2022

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Dugin A.G. Vestnik RUDN. International Relations, 2022, 22(1), 142—152
For citation: Dugin, A. G. (2022). Eurasianism as a Non-Western Episteme for Russian Humanities: Interview with
Alexander G. Dugin, Dr. of Sc. (Political Sciences, Social Sciences), Professor, Leader of the International
Eurasian Movement. Interviewed by M.A. Barannik. Vestnik RUDN. International Relations, 22(1), 142—152.

— Dear Alexander Gelyevich, in
December 2021, the International Scientific
Conference “Eurasian Ideology and Eurasian
Integration in the post-COVID World:
Challenges and Opportunities”1 where you
took part was held at RUDN University.
There were a lot of foreign guests among the
1 Eurasian Ideology and Eurasian Integration in the
Post-COVID World: Challenges and Opportunities.
International Conference, RUDN University, 10.12.2021.
URL: https://www.снг.com/ (accessed: 02.01.2022).
speakers, what testified their interest in this
issue. You stood at the origins of the revival of
Eurasianism in Russia. In your opinion, how
does this direction develop abroad?
— There are a lot of books, probably
hundreds, devoted to the development of
Eurasianism. Foreign scientists pay great
attention to Eurasianism. There are both
historical works (the first direction) and a whole
range of materials on neo-Eurasianism (the
second direction), which I represent (Dugin,
2002). I have seen about fifty dissertations
devoted to neo-Eurasian views of the late
20th and early 21st centuries. It has been created
an entire school, huge and influential. This
school is also studied very consistently, often, of
course, for the purpose of criticism.
Bruno Maçães, Portuguese Secretary of
State for European Affairs (2013—2015), wrote
a book about the Eurasian economy (Maçães,
2018), however, it is not about Eurasianism, but
about the concept of Eurasia, the shift to the East
of the main centers of civilizations, industry,
economy. Thus, the third direction is objective
Eurasianism, within the framework of which is
considered not only the Eurasian ideology of the
first wave — the works of P.N. Savitsky,
N.S. Trubetskoy (Trubetskoy, 2014a), and not
so much the works of L.N. Gumilev — an
“intermediate,” but very important thinker
between the first and third waves (Gumilev,
1993). The third direction is the study of the
Eurasian continent, the shift of civilizational
trends, and the economy. This is an autonomous
sphere of Western and Eastern studies, the
authors of which sometimes have only a remote
view of ourselves (Russia. — Editor’s note.).
All this together makes up the layer of the
so-called “Eurasian Studies” (Eurasian
Regionalism as a Research Agenda…, 2020).
Moreover, many American Sovietological
centers were renamed in the 1990s into the
Centers for Eurasian Studies. Strictly speaking,
the whole Sovietology is now called Eurasian
studies. Just as Sovietology critically studied its
opponent during the Cold War, so we, Eurasians,
are now being studied by Atlanticists. This fits
perfectly into the logic of Eurasianism itself, so
there is no need to be surprised at this.
In our opinion, Russian scientists should
develop more actively the Atlantic studies, that
is, to study our opponents — liberals,
Westerners, supporters of global Western
hegemony, just as they study us. And there is an
asymmetry here. I even think that there are much
more works devoted to Eurasianism, both
historical and contemporary, in the West and
abroad than in our own country. That is, we
ourselves do not appreciate our achievements.
— In your opinion, who can be
attributed to the Eurasians? What kind of
people are they in terms of their professional
activities and political views?
— The study of Eurasianism is carried out
both by representatives of academic science and
think tanks. There are a number of researchers of
historical Eurasianism, and even among us.
These are the historiographers of Eurasianism, as
well as representatives of academic science who
study L.N. Gumilev. Quite a lot of materials are
devoted to neo-Eurasianism, to me, to my
followers and supporters. At one time, we were
friends with Alexander Sergeevich Panarin, a
professional philosopher, a third-wave Eurasian,
who developed original approaches (Panarin,
There are also Eurasians as such, the people
who do not just study, but identify themselves
with the Eurasian style of thinking, the Eurasian
camp. They do not have to be in complete
agreement with me on everything, it is absolutely
optional, but they share common vectors that
unite all Eurasians of both waves — the first and
second (like L.N. Gumilev) and us.
What distinguishes a Eurasian from a non-
Eurasian is a question of principle. Eurasians
consider Russia as a civilization, not a country,
a non-Western civilization — this is the most
important thing. Here is the continent Russia, and
the Eurasian language union of N.S. Trubetskoy
and R.O. Jacobson (Jacobson, 1931).
The second sign is the opposition to
Western hegemony, the rejection of the Western
system of values in its claim to universality. This
is generally a fundamental question. Anyone
who does not think so is not a Eurasian.
He can be an interesting thinker, philosopher,
scientist, but he is not a Eurasian. Therefore, the
rejection of Western hegemony, the nonrecognition
of the West’s claims to the
universality of its civilization is a fundamental
Eurasian position.
And the third is an understanding of the
integral identity of Russia, which is not narrowly
and exclusively built around the Slavic-Orthodox
core, but also recognizes the role and
contribution of other peoples who, together with
us, built this civilization, although, of course, the
Russian people have the main and central role in
this process. Here is the third point. What
N.S. Trubetskoy has been called “pan-Eurasian
nationalism” (Trubetskoy, 2014b), is an
awkward word, I don’t like it; I don’t like
nationalism in general. But anyway, that’s the
core of the idea. With our traditions, historical
identities, we are full-fledged successors of this
gigantic Eurasian territory, we are its children
and we are responsible for it.
These three fundamental points of modern
Eurasianism (Russia-Eurasia) can be expressed
in science, the expert community, geopolitics. As
a matter of fact, the Russian geopolitical school,
also created by me (Dugin, 2011), is based on
this idea. So, there is Russian geopolitics and it is
thinking on behalf of the Heartland, and there is
an Atlanticist geopolitics that is thinking on
behalf of “sea power.” We have already met
something similar in the works of the founders of
geopolitics — H.J. Mackinder (1904) and
A.T. Mahan (2002), who saw Eurasia as
an entity. We see Eurasia as a subject, and
their common West — as an object. That’s
the difference. Thus, we supplement the
“chessboard” with the “chess piece” of Russia,
which acts as a full-fledged legitimate actor in
world politics, in order not to let them to turn this
“chessboard” themselves, not to let them to play
both white and black chess pieces at the same
time, as they used to do in those periods when
Eurasia was weak, having lost its own identity.
In other words, this is the Eurasian position. This
is a fairly broad concept.
The concept of Eurasianism can also include
such practitioners as S.Yu. Glazyev, Member of
the Board (Minister) for Integration and
Macroeconomics of the Eurasian Economic
Commission (Glazyev, 2018). Of course, this is
quite far from how the first Eurasians interpreted
their ideals, but this is also a modern, applied
part of Eurasianism. In addition, the strategy of
our military and the self-consciousness of the
modern Ministry of Defense since the 1990s is
also Eurasian. Now, thanks to the fact that
V.V. Putin also shares many Eurasian ideas,2
2 Meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club // President of
Russia [Заседание международного дискуссионного
military-strategic and political thinking
coincided, whereas earlier, in the 1990s, they
diverged. Therefore, the influence of
Eurasianism as a whole is very
multidimensional, multifaceted, covering both
the expert community and the scientific,
academic, both politicians and the military, as
well as economists.
— In addition to Russian Eurasianism,
we also know about the “Kazakhstani” view
of this idea, as well as its “Turkish”
understanding. Where else are there
supporters of the Eurasian idea? What are
their differences from each other? What are
the geographic limits of Eurasianism in
— In fact, the terms “Eurasia” and
“Eurasianism” have a very broad interpretation
(Bazavluk, 2018). As for Kazakh Eurasianism, I
believe that it was an unsuccessful attempt.
Initially N.A. Nazarbayev tried to find a place for
Kazakhstan as a society with a Eurasian identity
in the context of “Great Eurasia”3 and even
proposed the creation of a Eurasian constitution.
In general, it was a good and correct undertaking.
But gradually both he and other Kazakh
intellectuals considered that Eurasianism
(primarily in my person4) is the ideology of
клуба «Валдай» // Президент России]. September 19,
2013. (In Russian). URL:
president/news/19243 (accessed: 22.02.2022).
3 Speech by N.A. Nazarbayev at Moscow State
University named after M.V. Lomonosov March 29,
1994 // Committee of the State Duma of the Federal
Assembly of the Russian Federation for the CIS, Eurasian
Integration and Relations with Compatriots [Выступление
Н.А. Назарбаева в МГУ им М.В. Ломоносова 29 марта
1994 г. // Комитет ГД ФС РФ по делам СНГ, евразий-
ской интеграции и связям с соотечественниками]. (In
Russian). URL:
history/148/ (accessed: 02.01.2022).
4 Alexander Dugin: The peoples of Eurasia want a
democratic empire // Izvestia-Kazakhstan [Александр
Дугин: Народы Евразии хотят демократической импе-
рии // Известия-Казахстан]. No. 77 (622). (In Russian).

Russian imperialism and decided to build an
alternative Eurasianism.5
The combination of Kazakh nationalism
with Eurasian theses was a complete fiasco, not
taking shape either in theory or in an official
position, but playing the role of a simple
resentment. One can draw an analogy with the
“Right Sector,” armed with the ideology of
Ukrainian Nazism. The Kazakh version did not
receive its development, although initially
N.A. Nazarbayev sought to find a place for the
Kazakhs in the Eurasian context. The same
desire was due to the fact that the Eurasian
National University was named after
L.N. Gumilev. The Kazakhstani leader was
moving in the right direction, but then he got off
track, and later abandoned Eurasianism. Now
Eurasianism in Kazakhstan is represented
residually. In fact, this is an attempt to
create something in spite of the Russians, in spite
of me.
In Turkey, things are more complicated.
There, in fact, Eurasian sentiments are very
strong.6 A number of Turkish Eurasians assert
the Eurasian identity of Turkey, and they also
reject Western hegemony, they say that Turkey is
not part of the Eastern, Western or Islamic world,
but a whole special civilization. In this way they
are very similar to us. The same circles of
Turkish Eurasians often advocate an alliance
with Iran, China and Russia. This direction
of Turkish Eurasianism is represented by
the “Homeland Party” (Vatan), headed by
Doğu Perinçek as well as a number of Turkish
There is no contradiction in their version of
Eurasianism with our Eurasianism. Yes, this is a
Turkish view, a Turkic identity, but it fits
perfectly into Gumilev’s models. This is that new
thing, K.N. Leontiev had dreamed about — a
union of two traditional societies (Russian and
D1%8F%D1%82/ (accessed: 02.01.2022).
5 This issue of the journal contains a study by
A. Vakhshiteh, M.V. Lapenko and A. Mukasheva on the
genesis of Kazakh Eurasianism (Editor’s note).
6 This issue of the journal contains an article by Emre
Erşen on the Turkish perception of Eurasian integration
(Editor’s note).
Turkish), two empires (Russian and Ottoman) in
opposition to the liberal, democratic, anti-
Eurasian, Atlanticist West (Leontiev, 2010).
However, there is also a second version of
Turkish Eurasianism, which, in fact, is closer to
pan-Turkism, Turkish nationalism, since it
developed under the direct control of the
Atlanticist centers. Abdullah Gul, Ahmet
Davutoğlu — former associates of R.T. Erdoğan,
who promoted this version.
By the way, 15 years ago I had a polemic
with Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the Nationalist
Movement Party of Turkey. He argued that
Dugin was not proposing Eurasia (Avrasya in
Turkish), but “Avrusia.” Avrusia is a neologism
similar to Eurasia, but instead of Asia there is
Russia. That is he, like Kazakh thinkers in his
time, tried to get rid of the obvious dominant of
Russians in Eurasianism.
At the same time, the ideology of
Eurasianism was created by Russians, supported
and developed by Russians, and today it is
represented at the global level by us, including
me and my like-minded people, therefore
Russians are the creators of Eurasianism,
although the role of E. Khara-Davan cannot
be denied (Dugin, 2002, pp. 448—454),
Ya.A. Bromberg (2002), K.A. Chkheidze in
formulating the postulates of the Eurasian
Thus, there is a place for everyone in
Eurasianism — for a Kalmyk (Mongol), a Jew or
a Georgian. But, of course, this is predominantly
a Russian worldview. And if some Turkish
researchers recognize this, willingly join in the
development of the concept, and then there are
no contradictions, but the other part tries to
create their own, Turkish Eurasianism, and this
leads to the same fiasco as in the case of Kazakh
Eurasianism. Kazakh Eurasianism is an ultranationalist
version (for example, in its version,
Kazakhstan is considered the Heartland, not
Russia). The Turks, however, have more
conceptual grounds to build their own
independent Eurasian model, since they are an
imperial people. But such a model has not yet
been fully formed, and the one that exists is very
reminiscent of our Eurasianism, only there is
Turkey in its center.
In other countries, such as Iran, attention to
Eurasianism is also growing, as in China,
although not as fast as it seemed. However, when
V.V. Putin proclaimed the concept of “Greater
Eurasia”7 to complement the Chinese Belt and
Road Initiative, China began to show interest in
Eurasianism. I went on lecture tours to Shanghai
and Beijing, where huge audiences of Chinese
listened very attentively to my discourses on the
Eurasian ideology. This is not their concept,
Turan is something else, another civilization, but
they are discovering different aspects of this
worldview with great interest.
In Pakistan and even in the Arab world,
which has practically nothing to do with Eurasia,
interest in Eurasianism is awakening. Even in
Europe, there is interest: some representatives in
patriotic circles are saying that Europe should
join Eurasia and move away from America. Such
concepts as, for example, Gaullism or “The
Greater Europe project” are also part of
European Eurasianism. Therefore, Eurasianism
has many versions, many directions. Some of
them complement each other, fit together, and
some are completely mutually exclusive.
However, there is a main line here — these are
all the efforts that have been made by several
generations of Russian scientists, from the first
Eurasians to us. This has no analogues, and
in some sense, Eurasianism remains our
national idea.
— Is it possible to speak about an
unprejudiced perception of Eurasianism
abroad, in particular in the West, in terms of
assessments? Do those who believe that the
Russian authorities, using the Eurasian
theme, rehabilitate Soviet and imperial past of
Russia and seek to restore Moscow’s control
over territories outside of Russia, dominate?
— Both the Russian Empire and the Soviet
Union, and before that the empire of Genghis
Khan, the Blue Horde and other forms of
7 Plenary session of the St. Petersburg International
Economic Forum // President of Russia [Пленарное засе-
дание Петербургского международного экономическо-
го форума // Президент России]. June 17, 2016. (In
Russian). URL:
news/52178 (accessed: 22.02.2022).
statehood, for example, the Scythian empires that
existed in this territory, are all different formats
of a single civilizational beginning, since Eurasia
has very ancient roots, much more ancient than
only Slavic or Russian, than Tsarist Russia or the
Soviet Union. In this respect, all these forms that
unite Eurasia have a certain common style — a
special territory that is not integrated into
Europe, nor into the Chinese, Iranian, Indian or
Semitic civilizations. This territory is a
completely separate zone, which united with
historically different peoples and under different
ideologies. However, it has always been Eurasia
or the Great Turan. Turan, by the way, is an
Indo-European name, not Turkish, it is
mentioned in the Avesta when Turkey did not yet
exist. There was no such country, and the
Turkish people appeared much later, 1,000 years
after the Avesta was compiled. Turan was the
name given to the Iranian nomadic peoples of
Eurasia. In this respect, in this context, Eurasia is
a civilization that has a very long history.
When the Russian authorities today talk
about the Eurasian Union or Eurasian
civilization, sometimes this coincides with the
Russian world, Russian civilization, although
Eurasianism clarifies this point, because, for
example, Kazakhstan is clearly non-Russian, but
Eurasian, like many other territories. Therefore, a
reference to Eurasianism is an appeal to a special
civilization, the borders of which far exceed the
Russian Federation (Dugin, 2002). The Russian
Federation is a kind of “stump” of the Eurasian
civilization, it is a part, a body, but without arms,
legs and head. Of course, it is natural for the
Eurasian civilization to restore its historical
scope and historical boundaries.
It is also incorrect to talk about the revival
of the Soviet Union, since there is no communist
ideology in the Eurasian project. It is also
impossible to talk about the revival of the tsarist
empire, because the restoration of the monarchy
is not supposed. We are talking about the revival
of a single civilizational space, a single “Great
Space” (Großraum) under a new auspice, with
new principles and values, or rather, new
formulations of ancient Eurasian values. In this
sense, we are not talking about the exploitation
of the Eurasian states, but about the fact that the
Russian government, Russian policy under
V.V. Putin is becoming more and more rational
and consistent, historically justified, and the
concept of Eurasianism is increasingly beginning
to prevail in this policy. This is happening very
slowly, since the influence of Atlanticism in the
1990s was very strong. The elite remains liberal,
pro-Western, and V.V. Putin can’t or doesn’t
want to do anything about it. This factor,
of course, significantly slows down the
implementation of Russian ideology into Russian
reality, but gradually this process is still going
on. I am absolutely convinced that practically the
entire post-Soviet space will be integrated
(sooner or later) into a single Eurasian Union
under different conditions, in different forms and
at different times, that is, within the framework
of integration at different speeds. However, the
integration of the post-Soviet space will take
place in any case, and Russia will play a leading
role in this. This project does not involve
expansion, or a new version of imperialism, or
the ideological advancement of Russia’s views.
We are talking about creating a brotherhood of
peoples, cultures, religions in a single common
context. It can be counteracted and even done
effectively, it can be delayed, but it cannot be
avoided. Geography is destiny, and Eurasia is
destiny for all post-Soviet countries. The more
some resist this, the more painful it will be for
them to wake up one day in the Eurasian Union.
No matter how they treat him, it’s inevitable.
— In your opinion, is it permissible to
consider Russian Eurasianism as a non-
Western theory of international relations?
— Russian Eurasianism is a non-Western
theory of international relations, as well as a
political theory that goes beyond three classic
Western political theories: liberalism,
communism and fascism. This is the fourth
political theory (Dugin, 2009), the theory
of a multipolar world (Dugin, 2013), which
is most closely associated with Eurasianism.
Moreover, Eurasianism is a special, universal
epistemological canon that has its own view on
any humanitarian discipline. Eurasianism has its
own approach to everything, and in this respect it
is a universal episteme, which has not yet been
fully implemented and developed, but it is
already contained in the Eurasianism algorithm,
so it is quite easy to substantiate it.
I have repeatedly demonstrated how to
deploy Eurasian principles into the theory of a
multipolar world (Dugin, 2013), the theory of
international relations, an ethno-sociological
concept or an idea of the sociology of Russian
society, as well as anthropology, military
strategy or geopolitics. Based on the views of
L.N. Gumilev, you can build your own
ethnology, on the postulates of N.S. Trubetskoy
and R.O. Jacobson — the Cultural Studies, and
this was done, which is demonstrated by the
Russian school of structuralists, where
Jacobson’s thoughts developed.8 Philology and
phonology of N.S. Trubetskoy — that is what
our linguistics must be based on. As a matter of
fact, philology, linguistics, the theory of
international relations, the fourth political theory,
one’s own view of history, and much more —
this all is contained in the nucleus (core) of the
Eurasian worldview. In this respect, of course,
Eurasianism is a complete episteme.
— The collapse of the Soviet Union and
the collapse of the socialist system led to the
fact that Russian researchers made a U-turn
towards Western political science theories. As
a result, the conceptual ideas of Western
authors began dominating in the post-Soviet
academic discourse, and domestic sociophilosophical
and political thought was
pushed to the periphery. Is it possible to talk
about overcoming this trend today?
— If we talk about the domestic modern
humanities, then, of course, it does not develop
in the spirit of the Eurasian episteme. This fact
causes deep regret, since science without
ideology is impossible, which was perfectly
shown by M. Foucault, T. Kuhn, B. Latour.
Soviet science was a projection of the Soviet
ideology, and when the Soviet ideology
disappeared from society in the 1990s, the
science, built on the basis of this ideology also
8 This issue of the journal contains an article by
A.V. Shabaga dedicated to Eurasian structuralism
(Editor’s note).
collapsed, because it was impossible to continue
using the same methods and principles in the
absence of a Soviet, communist, Marxist
foundation. The Soviet people did not understand
this and continued to teach the new generation
what they had learned themselves, what created
an absolute epistemological crisis. In fact, it was
a kind of “dogmatic dream”: outside the Soviet
situation, people continued to reproduce Soviet
slogans, which from now on “missed” the target.
This primarily affected the humanities, where the
influence of ideological models is even stronger
and more comprehensive.
Firstly, a return to Soviet ideology is not an
alternative to the West. It all just has to die.
There is no other way to put it, since this
ideology no longer has a vital nourishment and
will simply degenerate until it dies at all and
releases the void that it fills today.
Secondly, the Soviet ideological model was
replaced by liberalism. It existed in our society
for 10 years as a political dominant, spoiled a lot
of things, but was not systematically
implemented in science. Fragmentally, liberalism
argued with the Soviet model and ousted
patriotism. However, the majority of Soviet
people, Soviet scientists and teachers who rushed
to use Western sources, strictly speaking, did not
understand anything in them. Therefore, a
paradoxical situation has arisen: one half of the
brain in post-Soviet education thinks in the
Soviet way, which no longer corresponds to the
existing realities, while the other thinks liberally.
It has nothing to do with reality; these two
hemispheres are in conflict with each other.
The Eurasian episteme exists extremely
peripherally, pointwise. Individual departments
are staffed by people who develop it. However,
even at the level of faculties, not to mention
universities, there is no Eurasian episteme. I
spoke with V.A. Sadovnichy, and we even tried
to introduce this Eurasian canon at Lomonosov
Moscow State University, but everything did not
end as expected, and our undertaking “bogged
At the same time, I continue to insist that it
is Eurasianism that is the matrix on which it is
possible to build science and education in the
humanities, to create our national school. It is
easy to “throw a bridge” from it to the Silver
Age, Russian religious philosophy and
Slavophilism — to everything authentic, truly
Russian that has existed for the last
200—300 years. But almost no one is doing this
now, so the majority remain just such “hybrid”
thinking combined the elements of the dying
Soviet mentality and the liberal one, which,
unlike in the 1990s, is also no longer supported
by ideology and is falling apart.
In principle, the modern education system is
a kind of monster that cannot transmit anything
except fragmentary knowledge. No consistent
methodologies, nothing beats each other. The
very development of the liberal matrix in the
West has recently rotated 180%; even the liberal
attitudes themselves have undergone a change.
50—60 years ago there was only one science in
the West, but today it is completely different.
This process cannot be followed, which adds
charm to the consistent degeneration of Russian
liberal scientists. Such a combination of insane
Western liberals with insane communists creates
an atmosphere of complete incompatibility of
scientific life. Eurasianism is an alternative,
although colleagues who continue to set the tone
in our educational field do not want to admit it.
— In your opinion, can the Eurasian idea
be considered as an ideological value basis for
Russian foreign policy?
— This is a very good question. If we talk
about where the influence of Eurasianism is
maximum, then, from my point of view, this is
the foreign policy of Russia under V.V. Putin.
Not declarations, worldview or educational
process, but foreign policy. Liberal institutions
have no effect on the real foreign policy pursued
by V.V. Putin himself, independently, and in this
policy the objective influence of Eurasianism is
very strong. V.V. Putin claims that Russia is not
an object, but a subject of world politics, and that
says it all. This is a break with liberal ideology,
but it is also not a Marxist approach, because
Marxist internationalism thinks quite differently.
This is the idea of Russia as a sovereign center, a
sovereign pole, which reflects the main Eurasian
principle: Russia is an independent civilization
from the West, and V.V. Putin builds his policy
in this way, proceeding from this position, and
this is fundamental.
Further, V.V. Putin is increasingly balancing
his orientation towards the West with relations
with the East: China, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and
India. He implements the integration of the post-
Soviet space, perhaps not as quickly, efficiently
and brilliantly as we, Eurasians, would like, but
he is doing it very consistently, without changing
direction. He may slow down along the way, he
may do something a little clumsily, but he is
moving forward. In this regard, the influence of
Eurasianism on the foreign policy of V.V. Putin
is the most significant.
Partly V.V. Putin acts like a Eurasian, partly
like a realist. One does not contradict the other at
all; it’s just that the realist idea is connected with
the state, and the Eurasian one with civilization.
However, V.V. Putin is increasingly turning to
civilization and values, on this basis rejecting
neoliberal hegemony, and this is already a purely
Eurasian approach, the state has nothing to do
with it. At the state level, he asserts
sovereignty — this is a realistic model, it does
not conflict with Eurasianism. At the same time,
there is nothing liberal in the foreign policy of
V.V. Putin. Even the desire to have good
relations with the West is not liberalism, but
pragmatism, calculation, and this is quite
acceptable. In general, I believe that in foreign
policy, Eurasianism has the greatest influence on
the Russian authorities.
— Do you think that today we are
witnessing the process of forming a “new
bipolarity” with the participation of the
United States and China? Is there a transit of
global power from the US to China?
— No, of course it’s not. It seems to me
that I know Chinese foreign policy very well,
because I communicate a lot with its ideologues,
intellectuals, and politicians who build it. I am
convinced that China has no thoughts of global
hegemony; it does not want to replace the United
States. The PRC thinks of itself as a very
influential, very powerful, universally attractive
civilization, but along with others. When the
Chinese talk about multipolarity, that’s what they
mean. China does not have the tools to offer all
of humanity a single ideology that the Soviet
Union or modern globalist liberals had. Still, the
Chinese ideology remains purely Chinese. It is
also very attractive for the countries of South
Asia, and somewhere it can expand its influence,
which, of course, is not global, planetary.
I think that we already now, today, live in a
tripolar world, where there is a globalist West,
bursting at the seams, China and Russia. These
are three civilizations, they are different and have
different volumes, ideas and guidelines. They are
in different relationships with each other. Russia
and China, I think, have a strategic partnership,
which allows this tripolar world to take place.
With the Western pole, which continues to insist
on unity and hegemony, the conflict is growing
both here and in China. The rest are invited to
take their place: either on the side of the West, or
on the side of China or Russia. Rather, either on
the side of China and Russia, since this is one
choice, in favor of multipolarity, or on the side of
the West.
As a matter of fact, this is how the problem
is solved in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan is invited to
be friends with Russia and China and reduce its
relations with the West, because the West creates
problems there. Similarly, for Ukraine, Georgia
or Belarus. There is no need to choose between
Russia and China — the question is not raised
anywhere, practically anywhere. We must
choose between the West or Russia and China.
There is such a choice, and it really is
You need to choose with whom to build
your future: in a unipolar global liberal world or
in a multipolar world where it is possible to build
other poles. If, for example, the European Union
leaves the influence of the West, then there will
be another pole — the European one and this is
wonderful. The Islamic world has every
tendency to become an independent pole. Africa,
Latin America, India — they might be other
poles. Thus, multipolarity is not a closed club of
participants. The fact that we live in a tripolar
world does not mean that it will always be the
same. Russia and China are ready to accept other
poles into their multipolar club. And Iranians,
Pakistanis, Turks, Indians understood it well.
Therefore, everything is much more complicated
than the confrontation of individual powers. In
today’s tripolar world, the line of antagonism lies
between Washington, on the one hand, and
Beijing and Moscow, on the other. Intermediate
territories, disputed zones, zones of conflict and
controversy, are Taiwan and Ukraine.
There is a serious antagonism within the
United States between the current administration
and almost half of the population. Thus, it must
be recognized that the opposition exists in Russia
in the person of Westerners-liberals, and in
China — in the person of Westerners, as in the
United States, so this tripolarity is also
accompanied by the presence of internal poles.
There is an Atlanticist opposition (elite) in
Russia, and an anti-globalist opposition (elite) in
the USA. Under D. Trump, we could observe
that opposition can even bring its own president
to power, and this is very serious.
In China, one can observe some less
understandable, less obvious pro-Western
tendencies, and N.N. Vavilov discussed a lot
about it. There are “Komsomol members,” pro-
Western liberal circles who would not mind
making an alliance with the United States within
the G2. That is, everyone has internal problems,
internal poles, so the multipolarity, we are
talking about, has both external poles and an
internal dimension.
— Is it possible to say that there is a
process of forming a “collective non-West”
among the countries of the Global South, for
which the Western-centric world is losing
relevance, attractiveness, and even poses
threats and challenges? What place can
Russia take in such a balance of power?
— Yes, it’s right. However, the “Global
South” is the term of I. Wallerstein, I don’t really
feel sorry for the Marxist (neo-Trotskyist)
theorists of international relations, since they
clearly underestimate what is called (in their own
model) the “second world” (semi-periphery) and
believe that this “peace” must suffer the same
fate as all the rest, since there is a single pole of
development. “Global South” vs. “Global North”
is a false dichotomy, so I would be careful not to
use the term “Global South” and speak simply
about the South.
Within the “Planetary South” itself, we can
see several southern regions. Thus, Latin
America is less and less satisfied with the
position of North America and Europe. This is
especially evident in the example of such
countries as Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua.
The same is becoming evident in Argentina and
Brazil (both presidents are scheduled to visit
Russia in the near future). Of course, Latin
America is in search of its own path, and Russia
can help here.
In Africa, we can see the activation of
Russia in the west of the continent (in Mali,
Burkina Faso) and in Central Africa. The
Russian presence in Africa, like the Chinese one
(which is already very large), will only grow.
Thus, Russia and China will help African
countries to become an independent pole. Africa
is increasingly opposed to the neo-colonial
policies traditional for Europe and the United
States. Similarly, one can speak of the Islamic
world, which is also sometimes included in the
South. The Islamic world is also looking for its
independence, and again Russia or China come
to the rescue, as, for example, in Iraq. Together
with China, we must organize this non-Western
world, helping it become strong, full-fledged,
independent, including independent of ourselves.
We do not want to change dependence on
the West for dependence on us. We do not carry
an obsessive, obligatory liberal ideology. We do
not require others to adopt any paradigms. On
the contrary, we help the civilizations of the
South (Latin America, the Islamic world, Africa)
to develop their own civilizational paradigm,
different from both the West and from us or the
Chinese. Such an approach will make Russia as
influential and respected actor in world politics.
We are heading towards this. V.V. Putin
understands this, and that is why what he does
fits into this picture.

Interviewed by M.A. Barannik / Интервью провела М.А. Баранник

Received / Поступило в редакцию: 10.01.2022

Дугин А.Г. Вестник РУДН. Серия: Международные отношения. 2022. Т. 22, № 1. С. 142—152

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