Geopolitics of Turkey In The Eurasian Context
After Azerbaijan regained control over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, analysts increasingly began to notice an increase in Turkish activity both in the Caucasus region and, more broadly, in Central Asia. Erdogan again began to strengthen his presence in the Turkic states, began to promote Turkish interests in Georgia, set his sights on Afghanistan, where a significant part of the population also has Turkic roots (Afghan Uzbeks).
It should be noted, however, that such tendencies do not fit into neo-Ottomanism. Most of the territories in question have never been part of the Ottoman Empire. During the Cold War era, Pan-Turkism and Pan-Turanism were artificially supported in Turkey, a NATO country, by the United States. In the last decade, when Erdogan began to pursue an increasingly sovereign and independent policy, pan-Turkism significantly weakened. And here again there are clear signs of its revival. But now in a different context. This is no longer pressure from the West, using Turkey in a big game against mainland Russia, but Erdogan’s personal initiative.
This became especially noticeable after Karabakh, and at the level of image both in Turkey and in Azerbaijan itself, the victory was attributed entirely to the Baku-Ankara alliance. In fact, the decisive factor, along with a good preparation for the war of Aliyev, was Putin’s consent to the forceful restoration of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. The main decisions were made in Moscow. And it depended on Putin whose Karabakh was.
Earlier, Putin agreed with the previous President of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan on partial unblocking of the Karabakh problem by transferring five regions. But Pashinyan, supported by Soros and the globalists, who staged a color revolution in Yerevan, annulled all agreements. And they don’t do that with Putin. It was thanks to Pashinyan’s policies and in response to the actions of the pro-American pro-Western lobby in Armenia that Putin decided on Karabakh. What this decision was, we see now. It could have been completely different. And here the Turkish-Azerbaijani alliance, I’m afraid, could not do anything about it.
Much the same is the case with Turkish positions in the Middle East, which in fact was once the territory of Ottoman control after Byzantium. And here Erdogan is pursuing his more or less successful policy only because Russia does not interfere with this. With Erdogan’s current opposition to the West, when in July 2016 the West and the CIA tried to overthrow him altogether, it is Moscow’s discrete support that allows Ankara to strengthen its sovereignty.
But this policy of Moscow, which turns a blind eye to many things in Syria, Libya, Iraq and now in Azerbaijan, is not a consequence of our weakness, but the result of a far-reaching geopolitical calculation. Russia is building a multipolar world, striving to limit as much as possible the territory of the sole hegemony of the United States. And the ambitious Erdogan contributes to this in practice. But all of this will work up to a certain limit.
Such a border is the military partnership of Ankara with the Russophobic Kiev, and too loudly flaunting the Turkish-Azerbaijani alliance (forgetting about Moscow, where in fact everything was decided), and the activation of Pan-Turkism in Central Asia. With the exception of the Ukrainian direction, which Ankara should have turned off altogether (and the sooner, the better), the steel vectors of Turkish policy could be continued – but not on behalf of NATO and with careful coordination of red lines with Russia.
Turkey’s entry into Central Asia is no longer Ottomanism, but a certain version of Turkish Eurasianism. Moscow theoretically has nothing against this, but Turkish Eurasianism should be coordinated with Russian Eurasianism, because Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are not just allies of Russia, but members of various economic and military structures. Turkey could well join them and act in a common way with Russia.
This is the only way to settle the Armenian issue, after all, Russia is responsible for Yerevan. And the post-war reconstruction of the region should take into account the interests of all parties. Including, by the way, Iran, which was somehow forgotten in the Karabakh war. But in vain.
Eurasianism is an extremely important ideology precisely because it has no dogmas. Its certain uncertainty and openness is its advantage, not its disadvantage. Russia, as a heartland, a heartland, a pole of Eurasia and a geographical axis of history, is the main factor in any effective geopolitical constructions.
If Ankara chooses a multipolar world, then welcome to the club and let’s discuss the wishes of all parties. If we are talking about a sole imperialist expansion or a new round of serving the interests of NATO, this is not just unconstructive, but suicidal.
For Russia, in turn, it is high time to pay special attention to the potential of the Eurasian doctrine, both in the ideological and in the geopolitical sense. Without ideology and relying on pure pragmatism, we simply cannot manage long-term integration projects.